Pursuant to your Order of August 16, 2017 the Working Group and Inter-agency Commission on military-technical cooperation and export control investigated the information published by The New York Times about possible transfer of missile technologies, in particular, the RD-250 missile engines, to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the State Enterprise "Production Association Yuzhmash".
Rocket engines RD-250 in the number of 3 units are the part of the first stage of intercontinental ballistic missiles R-36, P-36 orb (the GRAU index is 8K67, 8K69; the US index is SS-9 mod.1, SS-9 mod.3, the NATO-Scarp index), and of the first stage of the Cyclone-2 and Cyclone-3 carrier rockets. Rocket engine RD-252 (high-altitude modification RD-250) is a part of the second stage of intercontinental ballistic missiles R-36 and P-36orbs. Rocket engine RD-262 (high-altitude modification RD-250) is a part of the second stage of carrier rocket "Cyclone-2" and "Cyclone-3".
Following the results of the conducted work and materials provided by the state agencies the Working Group has established the following:
the existing system of state export control over the international transfers of military and dual-use goods excludes the possibility of transferring such goods to the countries which are under respective sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council;
during the period of Ukraine's independence, the State Service of Export Control has never issued the permission for the supplying the DPRK with any military and dual-use goods, including the RD-250 missile engines, its modifications and their components;
analysis by the Ukrainian specialists of the Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14 rockets' images, including their first stage main single-chamber engine, proved that they do not use the rocket engine RD-250, which is a two-chamber one. At the same time, it is not excluded that separate components of the rocket engine RD-250 could be used for its development;
the developer of the RD-250 engine is the Russian enterprise "Scientific and Production Association "Energomash". In 1965 this enterprise transferred documentation required for the organization of serial production of these engines to the State enterprises "Design Department" "Yuzhnoye" and "Production Association" "Yuzhmash";
all rocket engines suitable for flight use, including the RD-250 engine and its modifications, were delivered from "Yuzhmash" to the RSFSR, and later to the Russian Federation, only as part of missiles;
starting from 1991 Ukraine has not produced the rocket engines RD-250 and its modifications. The production line for these engines at "Yuzhmash" was dismantled in 1994. Since then Ukraine has had no capacities for the production of such engines;
30 rocket engines RD-250 and 10 rocket engines RD-262, which is the high-altitude modification of the RD-250, that were manufactured before 1991 and stored at the "Yuzhmash" warehouse for final products were used to assemble 10 carrier rockets "Cyclone-3", which were dispatched to the Russian Federation in during 1992-2008. The foregoing fact was confirmed by the relevant documents of the enterprise;
to date Ukraine has on the books and possesses :
- at "Yuzhmash": 3 rocket carriers "Cyclone-2", one of which was produced in 1983 and 2 - in 1986. They include 9 RD-250 engines and 3 RD-262 engines (3 RD-250 and 1 RD-262 in each rocket.) These launch vehicles were delivered to Ukraine from the Russian Federation in 2013;
- in the museum and training facilities of the city of Dnipro, there are: 1 incomplete dummy (without pipelines) of the RD-250 rocket engine; 1 training model of the intercontinental ballistic missile R-36 (8K67), which includes models of three RD-250 engines and one RD-252 engine. These products are used for solely educational purposes;
design, technological and other documentation for the production of missile technology and components is reliably stored at specially equipped premises, which is confirmed by the relevant authorities of Ukraine;
the relevant authorities of Ukraine constantly supervise the above-mentioned enterprises of the state rocket and space complex, thus excluding the possibility of unauthorized access to missile technologies by strangers. The foregoing fact is confirmed by the detention, arrest, and conviction in 2012 of the North Koreans who attempted to gain access to the relevant technological documentation;
to operate the RD-250 engines the relevant fuel components (heptyl, amyl) are needed. Ukraine does not produce these fuel components. Heptyl is produced by the Russian Federation, the United States, the PRC, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Manufacturers of the amyl oxidizer are the Russian Federation, the USA, the People's Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany.
It should be noted that Russia is conducting a systematic, planned and blatantly provocative information campaign aimed at discrediting Ukraine as a reliable and consistent partner that fulfills its international obligations.
According to our intelligence, in early June 2017, the Russian side proactively distributed among certain representatives of the military-diplomatic corps accredited in Moscow a position paper stating that the North Korean missiles were allegedly developed with the aid of Ukrainian specialists.
Besides that Russian intelligence systematically uses contacts earlier established with the expert and journalist community of different countries for the dissemination of provocative information that discredits Ukraine. In this case, the disclosure of the content of the mentioned position paper by American expert Michael Elleman, whose family has very close relations with key officials of Russian special services, is further support of the above fact.
According to the working group, Mr. Elleman was cynically used by Russian special services as one of many links of the earlier established by the Russian Federation system for the dissemination of provocative information.
There is a high probability that we will witness another attempt by the Russian Federation to discredit Ukraine in sensitive areas.
In order to neutralize the negative effects of the publication in The New York Times, and to exclude possible speculation on this topic in the future, as well as to disprove information disseminated by Russian special services, the Working Group prepared recommendations to the relevant government agencies.
In the course of verification and professional analysis of the available information and materials provided by public authorities, the members of the Interagency Commission, the working group, and experts emphasized the fact that Ukraine conscientiously and consistently adheres to all its commitments without any exception. In particular, in order to ensure the strict implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, approved by the UN General Assembly's, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Ukraine established an effective mechanism for strict state control over compliance and verification of its international obligations in this area.
The responsible position of Ukraine is underlined by the fact that our state voluntarily renounced its whole nuclear arsenal along with nuclear state status in exchange for assurances of sovereignty and security provided by the nuclear states - USA, Russia and the Great Britain in accordance with the Memorandum "On security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" signed at the OSCE Summit in Budapest in December 1994. However, the mentioned assurances given by the guarantor states remain unfulfilled.
Moreover, during the long-lasting period, the Russian Federation has been pursuing a hostile policy towards Ukraine, which resulted in the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as well as part of the of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. Russian aggression against Ukraine is currently carried out in the form of a hybrid warfare, where Russia, apart from conducting military operations, powerfully uses carefully pre-planned information provocations aimed at the systematic discrediting of Ukraine as a reliable and predictable partner, in particular in such areas sensitive to international community spheres as military-technical cooperation. One of the tasks for these provocations is manipulation by the Russian Federation with public consciousness aimed at its active covert participation in many destructive activities.
In this context, the Working Group considers the article in The New York Times of 14 August 2017 to be a tactic of obfuscation and distraction of the international community's attention from the possible participation of the Russian Federation in the North Korea's rocket program.